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Credit Risk in Peer to Peer Lending is an emerging field with practical implications for U.S 
banking system. Peer to Peer Lending is a type of online lending process which uses 
nontraditional bank channels. The inexorable rise of Fintechs has led to an extraordinary change 
in financial intermediation. This paper examines the factors that are critical in predicting default 
in Peer to Peer lending. The paper finds that FICO score, debt-to-income ratio , the loan amount, 
the credit grade assigned by the online lending platform are all critical factors of the credit risk 
evaluation process. Furthermore, models with hyperparameters such as neural networks and 
random forest do not reliably outperform classical logistic regression in the prediction of credit 
default. Finally, this paper makes vital policy recommendations to strengthen the efficiency of 
marketplace lending and provides a set of rules to prevent another crisis of the magnitude of the 
great recession.   
 
Keywords: Peer-to-Peer Lending, Credit Risk, FICO, P2P Loan Default, Consumer Credit, Logistic 
Regression. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This paper estimates credit risk default in the peer to peer lending market space in the 
U.S. The Peer to Peer (P2P) lending is the process of lending online to individuals and 
businesses outside of the traditional banking networks. P2P Lending or marketplace lending 
seems inexorably poised to grab a sizable portion of the market share in credit lending, as much 
as $90 billion in originations by 2020  (Treasury, 2016). The largest players in the U.S market 
include platforms such as Lending Club, Prosper, Peerform, Upstarts and Funding Circle. These 
platforms intend to displace traditional banking through financial disintermediation and 
technology. Essentially matching investors directly to borrowers and doing so more efficiently 
than banks. Given their lower legacy costs and efficiency gains from technological innovations, 
these platforms can offer borrowers lower interest rates than traditional bank (Milne & 
Parboteeah, 2016). Additionally, investors receive a higher yield and diversify their portfolio by 
owning an asset class historically earmarked for banks.  
However, P2P platforms possess less expertise in consumer lending, especially in 
assessing credit risk relative to banks. Credit risk in banking is defined as the likelihood that a 
borrower or counterparty fails to meet his/her contractual agreements to the lender. Moreover, 
asymmetric information issues are ubiquitous in P2P lending. Historically banks have minimized 
credit risk by acquiring a large amount of data on borrowers and putting a premium on relational 
rather than transactional lending (Calebe, Loriana, & Paolo, 2016). The P2P marketplace 





   This paper attempts to build predictive models which could be used by an investor to 
estimate credit default risk. To achieve this objective, data from a well-known platform Lending 
Club (LC) is utilized. The basic rationale for the study is that there is a need of investors to 
properly gauge the credit risk of a potential borrower hence a model could assist in the loan 
selection process. 
Although there are many factors that could trigger default on a loan, this paper 
investigates factors provided by the platforms such as:  the borrower’s credit score, debt to 
income ratio (DTI), revolving debt utilization rate, annual income, length of credit history, public 
records, level of education. 
This paper is organized in the following manner: Chapter II presents the literature review 
on credit risk in P2P marketplace. Chapter III describes the data and its origin.   Chapter IV 
presents the methodology in evaluating risk including logistic regression, neural networks and 
random forest. Chapter V presents the empirical results and finally chapter VI concludes with 
our findings and key policy recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Genesis of P2P Lending 
 
P2P Lending also known as marketplace lending stems from the development of the 
internet and the rise of e-commerce. The vast opportunities provided by the web and big data 
coupled with investors need for a higher yield have contributed to the birth of the industry. The 
first platform to see the day in the U.S was Prosper  marketplace which was set up in 2006 to act 
as marketplace were investors and borrowers could transact as an “e-bay” for loans (Milne & 
Parboteeah, 2016). The marketplace lending quickly established itself as an alternative to bank 
loans and credit cards. Platforms like Lending Club and Funding Circle emerged to capture 
market share in the lucrative consumer finance space (Schumpeter, 2013). Several factors have 
contributed to the success of P2P Lending, (1) a lagging regulatory regime, (2) the opportunity 
for investors to earn a higher yield in a period of  depressingly low interest rates, (3) the 
provision of credit in underserved segments, and (4) technological agility relative to the big 
banks (Milne & Parboteeah, 2016). However, as the industry matures small investors have been 
crowded out of the space by large institutional investors such as banks, hedge funds and asset 
managers (Demyanyk, Loutskina, & Kolliner, 2017). Furthermore, many policymakers and 
analysts have questioned the benefits of the industry to the average borrower. Many believe that 
P2P loans are predatory in nature and provide negligible funds to underserved areas and the 
underbanked population (Demyanyk et l., 2017). Moreover, some analysts fear the peer to peer 
industry exacerbates the level of financial distress by charging exorbitant rates. Additionally, 
sceptics claim an over supplying of credit to the financially distressed and minority segments of 
the consumer market with lower levels of education and higher levels of debt (Demyanyk et al., 
2017). An increase in the supply of loans ceteris paribus will lead to a decrease in the prevailing 
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market interest rate and increase access overall. However, given the lack of financial education 
in the general society marketplace lending may facilitate access to excessive and untenable 
amounts of debt. As attested by the Great Recession, borrowers and lenders alike can make 
suboptimal decisions leading to financial stress and higher levels of debt (Dore & Mach, 2019). 
To make matters worse, a study by Demyanyk et al. (2017) found that the debt level for P2P 
borrowers actually increased and credit scores decreased ex post receiving a loan. This is 
especially concerning given that marketplace lenders have always touted the product as a 
channel to pay down high interest credit card debt through consolidation loans (Balyuk, 2019) . 
According to LC, 66% of borrowers stated paying down credit card debt and debt consolidation 
in general as the intended use of funds, [see Figures 1 and 2], (Club, 2019) .  
 





Figure 2: Balances by loan purpose (2018 originations). 
Figure 2 shows that in 2018 almost 8 billion US dollars were borrowed on LC. The 
largest portion of the funds was borrowed for debt consolidation, followed by credit cards debt, 
“Other” includes things such as vacations, weddings and medical. Another half a billion went to 
home improvement purpose as stated by obligors. Debt consolidation and credit card accounted 
for $6.4 out of the $8 billion or 82% of the funds in 2018. This shows that debt consolidation is 
by far the most commonly stated usage of borrowed funds.  
2.2  Credit Risk in P2P 
 
The literature related to credit risk in P2P is nascent, however an enduring theme of said 
literature is information asymmetry. Information asymmetry as the name suggests is a situation 
in which one party to a transaction has significantly more information relative to the second 
party which can lead to market distortions. Investors in P2P industry face a large amount of 
information asymmetry (Serrano-Cinca, Gutiérrez-Nieto, & López-Palacios, 2015). Borrowers 
typically have a very good idea of their ability to repay based on private information such 
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earning potentials as well as any outstanding obligations while lenders do not. Using data from 
Germany Calebe, Loriana, and Paolo in 2016 found that P2P platforms were catering to a riskier 
segment of borrowers and supplying them with microloans. Moreover, they found that the return 
on P2P lending after adjusting for the risk was lower relative to banks. Notably Hertzberg, 
Liberman, and Paravisini in 2019 found that riskier borrowers in the marketplace tend to self-
select into longer term loans which are costlier in the long run and thus signal the borrower’s 
likelihood of default. Zou, Huixin, and Zheng in 2017 found that lenders in the marketplace face 
a higher credit risk than traditional banks due to adverse selection. Using data from “PPDAI” a 
China based P2P lender, they found that loans with less stellar credit ratings and longer terms 
charge off at a much higher rate. They also found that the order of credit rating and borrowers 
with high credit lines tend to perform well. In another study the determinants of credit risk were 
found to be the existing amount of debt of the borrower, the credit grade assigned by the 
platform, loan purpose as well as housing situation (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
Cornaggia, Wolfe, and Yoo in 2018 found that P2P lenders can create adverse selection issues in 
the consumer credit space by cherry-picking high quality loans and leaving banks with lower 
quality loans to originate. Sometimes even creating a race to the bottom by causing banks to start 
loosening credit quality standards to sustain market share or stamp out competition. Emekter, Tu, 
Jirasakuldech, and Lu in their 2015 study of lending club data using logistic regression  found 
that the key determinants of P2P credit risk include a borrower’s credit grade, debt to income 
ratio (DTI) , their FICO score and the revolving line utilization rate. Neural network models have 
also been implemented to gauge credit risk in P2P settings. A study by Byanjankar, Heikkila, and 
Mezei in 2017 found that it was indeed possible to assess credit risk in P2P and they found that 
financial factors rather than demographic ones were more predictive of loan outcomes. Most 
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studies have focused on identifying some determinants of credit risk and possible ways to 
improve the P2P market. This study contributes to the current literature in three ways: (1) it 
identifies key credit risk predictors in P2P lending market, (2) uses three quantitative methods for 
assessing default risk and (3) provides a predictive model that estimates ex ante credit risk at the 







Chapter 3: Data and Origins 
 
The data for this analysis comes from the Lending Club (LC). It includes individual level 
data for 36 months maturity loans made by LC in 2015 for over 5.8 billion dollars. The data 
includes loan level credit attributes such as income, debt to income ratio, the credit score and the 
status of the loan at the end of Q2:2019. There are 190,190 observations and 145 variables in the 
dataset. The data set was split in training and testing sets with 60% of observations in training 
and 40% in the testing dataset .Default in the analysis is defined as any account that goes to 
charge-off. The variables such as FICO, the credit grade and interest rate have shown a high 
information value. The interest rate factor showed a suspiciously high information value pointing 
to endogeneity. Accounts with high interest rate will charge off at a higher rate because they are 
inherently riskier but also because the interest rate will compound the cost of repayment and 
increase the likelihood of a bad performance.  
Table 1: A snapshot of the data set.  
 
 
Table 1 shows a snapshot of 2015 originations with credit grade shown in descending 
order. The credit grade is an assessment of loan quality assigned by the LC platform and is 
highly predictive of loan performance. Credit grade A is the lowest rated risk and G is the 
highest rate risk loan. Most of the lending is taking place in credit grades A through C. The 
Grade Balances Loans Count Mean Loan Mean Interest Rate Unit Bad Rate
A 681,256,925$     47,174           14,441$                 7.0% 5.5%
B 737,585,925$     58,312           12,649$                 10.1% 11.8%
C 626,305,000$     52,839           11,853$                 13.3% 19.1%
D 293,336,775$     23,705           12,374$                 16.6% 25.8%
E 92,915,750$        7,055             13,170$                 19.2% 32.0%
F 10,296,275$        954                 10,793$                 23.6% 42.6%
G 1,563,375$          151                 10,353$                 26.6% 39.1%
Total 2,443,260,025$  190,190        12,846$                 11.4% 14.9%
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default rate increases sharply has one moves from credit A to G. Finally, the interest rate charged 
by LC increases in tandem with the credit grade and the probability of default reflecting risk 






Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
This chapter examines the variable selection process and  methods for estimating credit 
default using three well known classification methods: Logistic Regression, Random Forest and 
Neural Networks.  
4.1 Variable Selection Process 
  An important endeavor in any scientific study is identifying factors that influence the 
phenomena one is trying to explain, it naturally follows that great attention must be given to 
identification and selection of pertinent factors. The process for selecting variables  and 
subsequently modeling them was based on three pillars: (1) identifying the 10 best predictors 
with the highest  information value, (2) identifying the top 10 variables that showed importance 
in random forest decision trees, (3) then the top 10 variables for  methods (1) and (2) are used  as 
inputs to model the probability of defaulting via logistic regression, random forest and neural 
networks.  
Information value based variable selection techniques. These are well known in credit 
risk analysis and have been extensively practiced in building credit risk models, (Deloitte, 2016). 
The information value (IV) and a closely related concept, weight of evidence (WOE) rank 
variables based on their ability to separate good vs bad loans. The formula for information value 
is the following: 𝐼𝑉 = ∑ (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖 − 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑖) ∗  𝑊𝑂𝐸𝑖
𝑧
𝑖=1                            (1)                              
, where z is the number of bins for the factor and 𝑊𝑂𝐸 = ln (
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑑
). The next table 






Table 2: Interpretation of information value (Baesens, Daniel, & Scheule, 2016). 
 
Information Value Interpretation 
Less than 0.02 The variable is not predictive 
0.02 to 0.1 the variable is weakly predictive 
0.1 to 0.3 the variable is moderately predictive 
More than 0.3 the variable is strongly predictive 
 
The next three figures and three tables show exploratory analyses that were performed on 
all variables to identify the most predictive factors of credit default. Factors with information 
values above 0.02 were further utilized in the model building process (Baesens et al., 2016). For 
instance, the credit grade assigned by LC is highly predictive given an information value of 0.38 
(Figure 3). The default rate increases monotonically from grade A to grades D, E, F, and G. 
Grade A has 5.5% default rate overall and accounts for 24.8% of the data or 47,174 loans. At the 
other end of the spectrum, credit grades D, E, F, and G have a default rate of 27.7% and account 
for 16.8% of the data or 31,865 loans. Grade is clearly an important predictor in assessing credit 
risk for LC loans. The conditional distribution of default changes drastically from one grade to 
the next (Figure 4 and Table 4). Another variable that showed some predictive ability was the 
FICO score at the time of the credit decision (Figure 4 and Table 4). Borrowers with a FICO 
score below 685 had a default rate of 18.9% compared to only 6.6% for those with 730 or more 
FICO scores. The information value of 0.14 makes FICO an important factor in the analysis as 
well. The debt to income (DTI) was found to be somewhat predictive as well with an IV of 0.06. 
There is a clear correlation between the amount of debt the borrower has and his/her future 




Figure 3: Default rate by credit grade. 
 
 




Grade Count Count % Good Loans Bad Loans Bad Prob WOE bin_iv
A 47,174      24.8% 44,573           2,601                5.5% -1.10 0.20
B 58,312      30.7% 51,438           6,874                11.8% -0.27 0.02
C 52,839      27.8% 42,738           10,101              19.1% 0.30 0.03




Figure 4:  Default rate by FICO bands. 
 
 







FICO Count Count % Good Loans Bad Loans Bad Prob WOE bin_iv
[-Inf,685) 87,863       46.2% 71,229        16,634      18.9% 0.29 0.04
[685,700) 36,224       19.0% 30,724        5,500        15.2% 0.02 0.00
[700,730) 42,567       22.4% 37,845        4,722        11.1% -0.34 0.02




Figure 5: Default rate by DTI band. 
 
 





DTI Count Count % Good Loans Bad Loans Bad Prob WOE bin_iv
[-Inf,13) 55,476      29.2% 49,047  6,429                11.6% -0.29 0.02
[13,21) 63,924      33.6% 55,054  8,870                13.9% -0.09 0.00
[21,30) 50,467      26.5% 41,642  8,825                17.5% 0.19 0.01
[30, Inf) 20,323      10.7% 16,038  4,285                21.1% 0.42 0.02
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Based on the information values installment amount, PMI and annual income of the 
borrower were the three most predictive factors. The interest rate, the subgrade, grade and DTI 
were also among the most predictive factors. The top 10 predictors identified through IV for 
further model building are shown below, (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Top 10 predictive variables based on information value. 
 
Random forest based variable selection techniques. These have been increasingly 
popular and are known to be efficient in building parsimonious models (Liaw & Wiener, 2002). 
This study focuses on variable selection based on the mean decrease in Gini coefficient. The Gini 
coefficient is a measure of node purity and ranges from 0, a case of complete purity in a node,   
to 1, a complete impurity in the node. The importance of a variable is then measured by 
assessing the degree of purity/impurity in the nodes when the variable is permutated or excluded 
from trees. Since the trees are being built randomly, variables that are important will keep 
performing well by having a higher impact in decreasing the Gini coefficient  (Dinsdale & 
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Edwards, 2019). Essentially the permutation helps measure the importance of individual factors 






                    (2). 
 
According to Figure 7, the random forest algorithm ranked the interest rate as the most 
important factor in predicting default. Variables such as FICO, the credit grade, DTI, revolving 
utilization rate were also found to be important. However, variables such as purpose, tax liens 
and inquiries were not found to be important. This result is consistent with earlier results found 
using information value. The rationale for exploring two distinct variable selection techniques is 
to arrive to a more robust collection of potential predictors. Given the technical nuances between 
information value based variable selection and random forest variable selection the emergence of 
similar variables from those distinct techniques reinforces the robustness of the factors in 
question. Information Value measures the predictive capability of a predictor in discerning good 
loans from bad loans. Random forest on the other hand builds several trees and permutates the 
variable in and out of the forest while assessing how pure, i.e. how homogeneous the nodes of 
the trees become in the presence/absence of the factor. Additionally, Random forest tends to 





Figure 7: Variable importance: Random forest. 
 
4.2 Modeling Techniques  
 
We start with logistic regression which is widely used in the industry for default 
modeling and provides a solid theoretical framework for estimating default. Secondly, we 
explore the performance of Neural Networks and Random Forest algorithm which are widely 
popular machine learning algorithms and have proven to be effective in classification problems.  
4.2.1 Logistic Regression 
 
The logistic model is an extension of the linear regression model in which we attempt to 
predict a binary outcome (0 or 1). This method is well known in the credit risk arena and 
classification problems in general (Baesens et al., 2016). The method allows for better 
interpretation of model coefficients unlike black box models such as neural networks and 
random forest. Logistic regression estimates the conditional probabilities via a nonlinear function 
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of factors. The logistic model outputs a probability by estimating the log linear relationship 




                 (3) 
Where;  
p is the probability of the event, Xk is the predictor k, βk is the coefficient of predictor k and k is 
the number of predictors in the model.                                                                                        
From equation 1, the logistic regression can be written in its log odds form as follows:  
  ln (
p
1−p
) = βo + β1 ⋅ x1 + ⋯ + βk ⋅ xk          (4)   
The maximum likelihood method is used for the optimization of this logit model.  The paper uses 
multivariate logistic regression analysis to estimate several models based on the most predictive 
variables identifies in part 4.1.   
4.2.2 Neural Networks 
 
Neural networks are deep learning algorithms that rose from research in Artificial 
Intelligence (AI). They tend to perform well in classification types of problems and have been 
successfully implemented in credit risk analysis. Neural networks have gained prominence in 
recent years thanks to their ability to model complex phenomena. A neural network model 
typically includes several completely connected neurons. At the start of a network there is an 
input layer comprised of all predictors followed by one or more layers. At the end of the neural 
network we have the output layer which consists of only one node. All the nodes are fully 
connected which allows for backpropagation to take place. Backpropagation is the process which 
allows the network to learn from its mistakes and to adjust its predictions by sending signals 
back and forth between parameters while minimizing a loss function. Neural networks uses a 
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sigmoid transformation to capture highly complex and non-linear relationships. The Sigmoid 
function is given by α(π)=
1
1+𝑒−𝜋
               (5). 
   Figure 7 shows a typical neural network with three layers. Firstly, there is one node for each 
predictor variable followed by a single hidden layer. The hidden node is also connected to a single output 
node. Furthermore, two control nodes are present. The first control nod is connected to the hidden layer 
and the second is connected to the output layer. The total number of edges is given by 
𝑝𝑘 +  𝑘 + 𝑘 + 1                      
 In the case of Figure 7 we have ,  8 * 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 11 edges. The neural network algorithm 
iteratively searches for the most optimal sets of weights for each node, like coefficients estimates 
in linear regression analysis. Once the weights are estimates new predictions can be made by 
providing the set of predictors. At the end of the neural network we have the output layer which 
consists of only one node. The prediction of neural networks in one episode is the following: 
𝑦(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑓(𝛽𝑘 , 𝑥𝑘(𝑡))
𝑁
𝐽=1
+  𝜀(𝑡)            (6) 
where βk are the parameters resulting from backpropagation, 
Xk are the inputs variables, 𝜀(𝑡) is the error, 




Figure 8: A neural network model. 
4.2.3 Random Forests 
 
  Random forests algorithm is an ensemble model that fits several trees to arrive to a vote 
in the case of classification problems hence the term “Forest”. The algorithm was introduced by 
Leo Breiman (2001) and performs well in classification types of problems such as predicting 
loan default or predicting admission to a university. Random Forest is robust due to several 
bootstrapped resampling that is done at the tree level as well as nod level to prevent overfitting 
and to decorrelate the different trees in the forest. Additionally, only a random subset of 
predictors is considered each time a tree is built, or a split is done. Effectively the algorithm 
randomly select a subset of predictors k from all inputs predictors such that  
𝑘 = √𝑧               
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where z is the total number of predictors in the model. Another advantage of Random Forests is 
their ability to rank variable by importance and thus select those variables that provide purity 
based on the Gini Index or Entropy. The Gini Index and entropy are both measures of 
homogeneity of class in the nodes of a tree. While Gini measures how many times a randomly 
selected observation from the data set would be incorrectly classified. Entropy tries to gauge the 
disorder in classifying observations relative to the target variable, having observations from 
different classes in a node signifies disorder.   
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦 = ∑ 1 − 𝑝(𝑐𝑘)𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑝(𝑐𝑘))
𝑛
𝑘=1
       (7) , 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = ∑ 𝑝2(𝑐𝑘)
𝑛
𝑘=1
                (8) 
Where p(ck) is the probability /percentage of class ck in a node.  
Random forest algorithm outputs predictions based on averaging the predictions of all the 
trees in the forest such that; 
         
1
𝑘
= ∑ 𝑘𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝐾𝑘=1                    (9) 
 
Where the index k runs over the individual trees in the forest (Stasoft, 2019).  
4.3 Model Performance Metric 
 
Although there are several metrics for comparing binary classifiers, this analysis focuses 
on the area under the curve (henceforth AUC). AUC is one of the best-known model 
performance metrics in assessing the predictive ability of binary classifiers. The AUC curve is a 
measure of the area under the receiver operating curve (ROC). ROC is a graph displaying the 
performance of classification models at all possible probability thresholds. ROC measures the 
discriminative power of a classification model. AUC values range from 0 to 1 with higher AUC 
values suggesting higher predictive power of the model. In this paper a higher AUC value 
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implies the model is correctly identifying good loans as being good and bad loans as being bad. 
For instance, an AUC of 0.9 implies that a randomly selected borrower from the defaulters group 
has a probability default value higher than that of a randomly selected borrower from the non-
defaulter’s group 90% of the time. AUC is leveraged in this paper to benchmark the performance 




 ∑ ∑ 1𝑛𝑗=1 𝑝𝑖 > 𝑝𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1            (10) 
Where i covers all the observations with true class 1 and j covers all the observations with true 
class 0 ; pi and pj  denote the probability value assigned by classifier to observation i and j when 






Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
 
This chapter provides the results of predicting the likelihood of credit default based on 
identified credit risk attributes via three distinct classifiers. Moreover, the magnitude and 
direction of predictors based on four logistic regression models are displayed. Finally, the 
performance of logistic regression compared to random forest and neural networks based on 
AUC is presented. Based on the empirical results of four logistic regression models (Table 6), we 
find that credit grade is an important factor as well as FICO. Moreover DTI, the number of 
inquiries in past 6 months, number of satisfactory trades, having a mortgage account and the 
payment amount are also important predictors. Moreover, loan amount was found to be 
statistically significant although the magnitude of the coefficient suggests loan amount to have a 
limited impact on default in practice. A higher loan amount implies a higher monthly payment 
which can be difficult for borrowers especially those with existing debt. Additionally, revolving 
debt utilization rate, which is the percentage of total credit available currently utilized was found 
to be statistically significant.  One surprising finding is the direction of the coefficient for 
revolving utilization rate. Intuitively one would expect borrowers with higher revolving line 
utilization to be more prone to defaulting since they already have a current debt load that requires 
servicing. The logistic regression results from Model 4 suggests that borrowers with higher 
revolving debt utilization are less likely to default once we account for other factors. One 
potential explanation of this is that people with higher revolving debt are more experienced with 
credit products and will on average default less even after accounting for the higher debt load 





Table 6: Logistic regression results. 
 
 
Note: the names of factors have been abbreviated. The factor inq6 is inq_last_6mths , the factor 
instal is installment , loan is funded_amnt and mtg_fl_Yes is binary factor for mort_acc.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Intercept) 1.46 *** 1.46 *** 1.71 *** -2.93 *** 
 (0.27)    (0.27)    (0.27)    (0.04)    
gradeB 0.61 *** 0.60 *** 0.61 *** 0.77 *** 
 (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    
gradeC 1.07 *** 1.05 *** 1.08 *** 1.29 *** 
 (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    (0.03)    
gradeD 1.41 *** 1.40 *** 1.44 *** 1.68 *** 
 (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.03)    
gradeE 1.67 *** 1.65 *** 1.71 *** 1.95 *** 
 (0.04)    (0.05)    (0.04)    (0.04)    
gradeF 2.17 *** 2.13 *** 2.19 *** 2.44 *** 
 (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)    (0.09)    
gradeG 1.99 *** 1.94 *** 1.99 *** 2.25 *** 
 (0.22)    (0.22)    (0.22)    (0.22)    
income -0.00 *** -0.00 **  -0.00     -0.00     
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    
FICO -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 ***         
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)            
dti  0.02 *** 0.01 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    
inq6 0.11 *** 0.11 ***                 
 (0.01)    (0.01)                    
loan 0.00 *** 0.00 ***                 
 (0.00)    (0.00)                    
num_sats         0.01 ***                 
         (0.00)                    
mgt_flYes         -0.25 *** -0.24 *** -0.24 *** 
         (0.02)    (0.02)    (0.02)    
instal                  0.00 *** 0.00 *** 
                 (0.00)    (0.00)    
revol_util                         -0.08 *   
                         (0.04)    
N 114115        114115        114115        114115        
AIC 90147.95     89942.31     90103.11     90407.07     
BIC 90263.69     90077.34     90218.85     90522.81     




The logistic regression output for model 1 in Table 6 can be interpreted in the following 
manner:  
• Having credit grade B, versus A increases the probability of default by 0.61 (grade A 
is the reference level).  
• The probability of default increases monotonically as one goes from grade A to F 
with a slight decrease at grade G. 
•  Ceteris paribus, each 10-point increase in FICO score decreases the probability of 
default by 0.1.  
• Ceteris paribus, each 10-point increase in DTI increases the probability of default by 
0.2.  
• Ceteris paribus, each additional credit inquiry in the past 6 months increases the 
probability of default by 0.11.  
The magnitude of the coefficient for the number of recent credit inquiries is particularly 
large. This indicates that borrowers with large numbers of credit inquiries within 6 months will 
have a very high probability of credit default. Intuitively this makes sense, many credit inquiries 
by a borrower is likely due to a severe shortage in liquidity leading to what’s known in the 
banking industry as “credit shopping”. Credit shopping refers to the process of contacting several 
financial institutions in a short period of time to accumulate debt which is unlikely to be repaid.  
Models created with random forest and neural networks are highly complex and lack the ease of 
interpretability of coefficients as in the case of logistic regression. However, we can infer from 
those models using variable importance plots. The random forest and neural network models 
found similar results to the logistic regression. Both the neural network and random forest 
algorithms found the most predictive factors were the interest rate, FICO score, credit grade, 
34 
  
PMI, DTI and the number of inquiries in the past six months. The random forest model built 500 
trees with two variables used for splitting at each node. The neural network model with four 
hidden layers was found to be the most optimal model among several neural network models 
with a maximum ROC of 0.68 (Figure 9). Further comparison of the logistic regression model 
versus random forest and neural network shows that a neural network is marginally the best 
based on ROC (Table 7). One interesting finding is that although neural network models are 
much more complex, they do not always provide better performance. The neural network model 
performed only slightly better than the logistic model on the testing data set (Figure 9, Table 7). 
This finding is of practical importance given that logistic models provide better clarity and  





Figure 9: Performance on training data (5 folds cross validation). 
Table 7: Model performance on testing data. 
 
Model ROC 
Logistic model 1 0.68 
Logistic model 2 0.6831 
Logistic model 3 0.6812 
Neural Network 0.6848 













Chapter 6: Conclusion and Policy Implications 
P2P lending has been increasingly relevant in today’s banking and financial markets. 
There are great amount of opportunities to gain from this novel market and many lessons yet to 
be learned. This thesis explores the main factors for predicting loan default in P2P setting and 
compared the performance of three modeling techniques. The study found the credit grade of the 
borrower, FICO score, DTI, the number of inquiries and annual income to be highly predictive of 
loan outcomes. Moreover, loan amount, revolving utilization rate and installment amounts were 
found to be statistically significant. Furthermore, borrowers with mortgages tend to be more 
creditworthy.  Another key finding of the paper is that black box models with hyperparameters 
such as neural networks do not necessary yield better performance than classical methods such as 
logistic regression in predicting credit default. There are three main policy recommendations 
from this paper. 
First, the government regulations are needed to harmonize the regulatory regime for 
banks and P2P lenders. Marketplace lenders are currently benefiting from regulatory arbitrage 
since they are not subject to the same level of regulation as deposit-taking institutions. Creating a 
uniform regulatory framework will even the level playing field between platforms and traditional 
banks.  
Second, limit risk taking: as the data shows Fintechs are growing fastest in high risk 
segments i.e. highly indebted, low credit and low-income segments. Despite this high growth, all 
the money invested is raise by private investors and the platforms do not assume any risk. A 
sudden economic downturn could lead to economic collapse since billions of dollars of loans will 
no longer be serviced. This could be more damaging than the 2008 great recession because most 
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of the investors on P2P platforms do not have enough political clout to access public rescue 
packages unlike banks in 2008.  
Third, expand access to financial literacy, from the data above we can see that as much as 
82% of the loans issued on the platforms are reportedly for consolidation purposes. This shows 
that there is a large segment of the country in debt.  
High levels of debts are always dangerous for the economy as shown during the great 
recession. More needs to be done to raise awareness of financial products and the risk in 
accumulating debt. Some natural extensions of the paper in the future include: (a) modeling 
credit default using survival analysis, (b) combining loan-application level data from several 
platforms to build predictive models that are more robust. Survival analysis is more dynamic 
since the time to default is a critical piece of credit risk assessment. Some later stage defaults do 
not incur any losses to the bank while default in the early stages of loan repayment can be 
extremely costly. However, the current paper only considers instances of default. The 
combination of data from several platforms can also be more robust and instrumental in 
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Appendix A: Data Dictionary 
 
 
Factor Alias Definition 
Annual_inc Income The self-reported annual income provided by the borrower. 
DTI  A ratio of total monthly debt payments on the total debt obligations. 
Grade  LC assigned loan grade. 
HomeOwnership 
 
 The home ownership status provided by the borrower. 
MortAcc 
 
 Number of mortgage accounts. 
RevolUtil 
 
















Loan The total amount committed to that loan at that point in time. 
 
Num_sats  Number of satisfactory accounts. 
Installment 
 
Instal The monthly payment owed by the borrower if the loan originates. 
 
PMI  Ratio of payment to income.  
Sub_grade  LC assigned loan subgrade. 
 


































Appendix D: FICO and Revolting Debt Utilization among Borrowers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
